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DISQU IET ON THE EASTERN FRONT:
LIBERAL AGENDAS, DOMESTIC LEGAL
ORDERS, AND THE ROLE OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW AFTER THE
COLD WAR AND AMID RESURGENT
CULTURAL IDENTITIES

Jacques deLisle*
On the eve of the twenty-first century, a

fin-de-siecle unease

pervades assessments of the future roles of international law.
The recent past seems a poor guide to what promises, or threat
ens, to be an era posing unfamiliar transnational problems and
calling for innovative legal solutions.1 Two developments have
struck at the foundations of contemporary international law.
These are the collapse of the Soviet Union and consequent
global retreat of communist ideology, and the resurgence of
ethnicity, religion, and culture as principal bases of identity and
foci of conflict with international significance.2 They have ren
dered suspect the underlying premises of much received -vvisdom
on both sides of the debate about whether international law
plays, or would come to play, a major or a marginal role in world
affairs.3
* Assistant Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School; J.D., 1990, Harvard
Law School; Ph.D. candidate, political science, Government Department, Harvard;
A.B., 1982, Princeton University.
l. On the end of the nineteenth century as an era in which an old, coherent order
had unraveled, and in which new circumstances demanded a new approach or under
standing that had not yet formed, see generally CARL E. ScHORSKE, FIN-DE-SIECLE VI
ENNA: POLITICS AND CULTURE 3-4 ( 1981); GEOFFREY BARRACLOUGH, AN INTRODUCTION
TO CoNTEMPORARY HisTORY 31-32 ( 1967).
2. As indicated below, these phenomena jointly produce circumstances that frame
the challenges now confronting international law. The nvo developments are also inter
related in a simpler way. Ethnic tensions and nationalist passions contributed greatly to
the disintegration of the Soviet Union and its empire. This collapse, in turn, helped to
unleash ethnic, cultural, and religious politics within and beyond the former Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics. See, e.g., ZmGNIEW BRZE ZINSKI, THE GRAND FAILURE 87-90,
247-50 ( 1990).
3. See, e.g., INIS L. ClAUDE, JR., SwoRDs INTO PLOWSHARES 69-80 (1956) (describing
some of more expansive notions of international law's prospective role, under United
Nations, as constraint on states); EDWARD H. CARR, THE TwENlY YEARS' CRISIS: 19191939 170-80 (2d ed. 1946) (seeing relatively significant role for international law as law
among community of states); HEDLEY BuLL, THE A'\IARCHICAL SoCIETY 140-42 (1977)
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The result is a crisis in international law, and in thought
about the nature and importance of international law.

It is a

crisis in the Chinese sense - a conjunction of danger and op
portunity.4 This concept of crisis is apt, for today's dangers and
opportunities come in large part from events in the East (not
least from the Chinese world) and from the choices the West
faces in responding to them. While the crisis is ubiquitous, it is
these East Asian developments, and possible reactions to them,
that provide the principal examples here.
The present challenges are qualitatively different from
seemingly similar past assaults on established notions of interna
tional law as part of a "liberal" or "Western" international order.
The new challenges are arguably more severe and certainly more
complex. The possibility of a coherent and relevant response
appears to lie not in a simple defense of familiar ideals but in a
new, and selective, emphasis on human rights and liberal values
as a fighting faith and as a basis for a transnational consensus
among subnational groups.5 If this claim is correct, the project
and the prospect for international law in the coming years are,
perhaps more than is generally recognized, matters of transna
tional, even domestic, law and politics.
The international legal and political order that is now in
deepening crisis can still be characterized and caricatured as a
liberal order. It posits autonomous, formally equal, sovereign
states as its basic units. States, individually or collectively, are no
(discussing international law's real, if modest, contributions to intemationai order);
HANs]. MoRGANTHAU,

PoLITICS AMoNG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR Powu. AND PEACE

279-82, 297-300 (5th rev. ed. 1978) (describing real but quite circumscribed role for law
in international order structured by self-interested pursuits of nation-states seeking
power and security);

(1979)

KENNETH N.

WALTZ,

(describing international order

THEORY OF

as

INTERNATIONAL

PoLITICS 170-76

defined by distribution of power among

states, with little or no role for Jaw, and bipolar structure as conducive to stability);

RoBERT

0. KEoHM-lE,

AFTER HEGEMONY: CooPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE WoRLD

PoLITICAL EcoNOI'viY 245--47 (1984) (assessing, favorably, prospects for cooperative de
velopment by '"like-minded countries" of rule-like practices and institutions to govern
interactions among states with actually or potentially complementary interests).

4.

The Chinese word

"weiji"

is usually translated into English

composed of characters meaning "danger"
CHINESE-ENGLiSH

(wei)

DICTIONARY 307, 713 (1983)

as

"crisis."

and "opportunity" (ji).

Weiji is

See THE PINYIN

(providing English translations for all

u'1ree Chinese terms).

5. This argument, set forth briefly in this Essay, is explored more fully with respect
to U.S. laws and Chinese human rights issues in a forthcoming article, Beyond Cultural
Relativism and 'Evangelical Liberalism':
Addressing Hmnan Rights in China.

Defining a Role for A men·can and International Law in
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more authorized or justified in examining or forcing changes in
the internal practices and preferences of other states (or in de
stroying other states) than a person would be in his or her deal

ings with fellow citizens in a liberal society domestically. Such an
order creates normative and structural imperatives not to recog
nize and confront diversity in legal and political behavior, and
attitudes within and among states.6

Certainly, this order has not been immune from pressures
for change. The ideological polarization of the Cold War, the
critique of national quests for "modernization" as "Westerniza
tion," and the efforts during the last couple of decades to move

human rights farther up on international political and legal
agendas were all in some tension with a Westphalian, nation
state based order.7

Nonetheless, the structure long survived

those corrosive forces,

as

we saw underscored in the renaissance

surrounding the Gulf War, of collective security pursued within a
framework of venerable international legal rules and conven
tional international institutions.8

Whether such an approach

6. See generally Convention on Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, arts. 4, 8,
9, 49 Stat. 3097, 165 L.N.T.S. 19, 25, 27; Declaration on Principles of International Law
Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the
Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at
121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970) (recognizing dury of nonintervention in states' domestic
choices of political, economic, social, and cultural systems, and inviolability of states'
territorial integrity and political independence); Michael Doyle, Kant, Liberal Legacies
and Foreign Affairs, 12 PHIL & Pus. AFF. 205 (1983); Stephen D. Krasner, Regimes and the
Limits of Realism: Regi mes as Autonomous Variables, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 355, 35556, 366-67 (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983) (discussing consequences of conception of
international system as being composed of egoistic sovereign states differentiated only
by power capabilities).
7. On the Peace of Westphalia as a defining moment in the emergence of a nation
state-based international order that overcame earlier competing claims founded in pur
portedly universal norms, see HARoLD K j ACOBSON, NETWORKS OF INTERDEPENDENCE 13
(2d ed. 1984). Communist, liberal democratic, and human rights ideologies obviously
entail claims of universal validity that disregard national boundaries. The Westerniza
tion-modernization debate is in more subtle tension with a pure nation-state order.
While the charge of "Westernization" suggests a cultural relativism that appears to en
dorse national autonomy and distinctiveness by rejecting the West as a universal model,
the charge also labels social, political, and legal phenomena that in practice have fre
quently accompanied economic development or decolonization as someu'ling other
than inevitable aspects of modernization. Thus, what might be defended as generically
modem or inevitable is denounced as acquiescence in another contingent ideology
claiming universal applicability. See general!y C. E. BLACK, THE DYNAMICS OF MoDERNIZA
TION 5-13 (1966) (discussing meaning of modernity).
8. See S.C. Res. 674, U.N. SCOR, 295lst mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/674 (1990); S.C.
Res. 678, U.N. SCOR, 2963d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (l990); S.C. Res. 686, U.N.
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the consequences of the
decline of Soviet power and communist ideology and the erup

'
'

as

tion of subnational and transnational allegiances further unfold,
are much closer questions.
Strong claims, both explicit and implicit, that culture, reli
gion, or ethnicity define the proper boundaries of a sovereign
state, and the appropriate content of its legal rules, are rampant.
On the battlefields of the former Yugoslavia, in the latter-day

i

l

I

1

in the proliferating struggles over the place of Islam in society

ji

and government throughout much of Asia, there emerges a

iI

Confucian pronouncements of Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew, and

broad challenge to the relevance of an international legal order
that does not take as a central concern cultural differences
among and within nations, and the substantive and substantial
diversity in approaches to domestic and international law and
politics that such differences entail.
The challenge is more profound than a cultural relativist or
anti-colonialist critique, updated for the 1990's and brought into
sharper focus by the removal of the distorting lens of Cold War
politics. In its heyday, the cultural relativist view that Western
legal values, including human rights and other assertedly univer
sal principles of international law, were inappropriate for much
of the world was held primarily by left-leaning Western intellec
tuals. Such commentators were distrusted as potentially conde
scending

or

anti-developmental

in

much

of

the

recently

decolonized world, and nearly disregarded in the practice of in
ternational law and politics.9
SCOR, 2978th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/686 ( 1991); H.RJ. Res. 77, 102d Cong. , 1st Sess.
( 1991) (enacted as P.L.102-1); Letter to Congressional Leaders on the Strike on Iraqi
Intelligence Headquarters, 29 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1183 (June 28, 1993) (citing
international law basis, and compliance with U.N. procedures, for action); Remarks to
United States Army Troops Near Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, 26 WEEKLY CoMP. PREs. Doc.
1900 (Nov. 22, 1990) (stating U.N. and international law bases for U.S. military pres
ence); cf DANIEL P. MoYNIHAN, ON THE LAw OF NATION S 120-23 (1990) (describing
deciine in U.S. government's commitment to international law during 1980's).
9. See, e.g., Jack Donnelly, Cultural Relativism and Universal Human Rights, 6 HuM.
RTs. Q. 400 (1984) ( providing general and critical discussion of cultural relativism);
Adamantia Follis & Peter Schwab, Human Rights: A Western Construct with Limited Appli
cation, in HuMAN RIGHTS: CuLTURAL AND IDEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 1 ( Follis & Schwab
eds., 1980) (setting forth strong version of cultural relativist perspective); BILL WARREN,
IMPERIALISM: PIONEER OF CAP ITALI SM 252-55 ( 1980) (arguing that leaders of former col
onies belatedly recognized growth-destroying effects of embracing theories that blamed
underdevelopment on Western-dictated order and rejected progressive colonial legacy

I

l

I
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Where kindred notions had greater practical impact, they
generally proved compatible with an international legal order of
nation-states as juridically equal "black boxes." Thus, anti-colo
nial and separatist assaults on existing arrangements typically in
voked the norms of the existing system10 - seeking recognition
of a new sovereign state within colonial boundaries or coinci
dent with areas inhabited by a particular people. With borders
redrawn in the name of self-determination around a more cul
turally or ethnically homogenous group, the new nation could
be absorbed into the fold as just another state with internal af
fairs of presumptively little international legal import.11
Where the international community could not or would not
ignore deviance in domestic legal regimes, excuses and justifica
tions often were available. When illiberal regimes and the con
sciences of liberal regimes could not find sufficient cover in the
principle of sovereignty over domestic affairs or in the necessity
of accommodating unpalatable allies in the Cold War, the expla
nation was likely to be that suspect states merely had, for exam
ple, struck a somewhat different balance between civil-political
and socioeconomic rights (all of which were highly valued and
universally shared) . Alternatively, deviant state conduct might
be dismissed as being part of a necessary transitional period of
progress toward realization of fundamental rights and the rule

of emerging indigenous capitalism). U.S. statutes conditioning aid and trading privi
leges on the domestic behavior of foreign governments contain little or nothing that
suggests any accommodation of cultural relativist arguments. Typical statutory stan
dards are compliance with the requirements of "internationally recognized human
rights" (a phrase likely to draw the scorn of cultural relativists), market-oriented eco
nomic principles, demoLratic government, or free emigration. See 22 U.S.C.S.
§ 2304(d)(l) (1994); 19 U .S.C.S. § 2432 (1994); 22 U.S.C.S. § 2295(a) (1994); 12
U.S.C.S. § 635(b) (2) (1994); 22 U.S.C.S. § 2304(a) (1) (1994) (providing, in security
assistance statute, that United States shall "in keeping with the constitutional heritage
and traditions of the United States" promote observance of human rights in other
countries "without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion").
10. See, e.g., RoBERT W. TucKER, THE lNEQUALITI OF NATIONS 58-60, 67-69 (1977).
11. Although the new nation-states created through decolonization in Asia and
Africa often had much less ethnically and culturally homogenous populations within
more arbitrarily drawn boundaries than did most of the states that emerged from ear
lier waves of nationalism in Europe (or are now emerging in the former Soviet and
Soviet-dominated areas), the ex-colonial states were more culturally (and geographi
cally) integrated than the vast and European-based empires to which they formerly be
longed. See, e.g., CRAWFORD YouNG, THE PoLITICS OF CuLTURAL PLURALISM 1 1-12, 23-26,
66-71 (1976) (examining interaction of culture, identity, and politics).
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of law.12
The culturalist challenge to international law

as

we enter

the t<.,venty-first century is qualitatively different, and more at
odds with the principles of the existing order, in two ways. First,
such assaults on the integrity of many nation-states and on the
character of their internal political and legal orders are not sim
ply balkanizing.

Rather, they are often supranational, cutting

across international boundaries and binding together dissident
or nationalist groups in several states. Pandemonium looms, but
the fragments also threaten to coalesce into broader clashes of
civilizations.13 Thus, Islam not only defines the fault lines be
tween secular central governments and their religious revivalist
local opponents in China, Malaysia, and nations much nearer
the heart of the Muslim world, and as far west as Bosnia. It also
joins some of these groups together in a shared project that
numbers among its aims a return to the substantive legal and
governmental principles of Islam.14
12. For an example of both sorts of claims in post-Mao official Chinese pronounce
ments, see R. Randle Edwards, Civil and Social Rights: The(fly and Practice in Chinese Law
Today, in HUMA.N RIGHTS IN CoNTEMPORARY CHINA 41, 67 ( Randle Edwards et a!. eds.,
1986). For an indication that the post-War U.S. political and legal tradition accords
some substantial recognition to economic and social rights, see KENPO UAPAN CoNST. ]
arts. X-XL ( including, in constitution imposed by U.S.-led post-World War II occupa
tion government, social and economic rights, as well as rights similar to those found in
U.S. Bill of Rights, among "human rights" guaranteed to Japanese citizens). For an
indication that contemporary U.S. legislation recognizes some form of the claim that
shortcomings during a "transition period" must be recognized and accepted, see 2 2
U.S.C.S. § 2295a ( permitting aid to states formerly pan o f Soviet Union i f such states
are «acting to . . . make significant progress tmvard, " inter alia, democratic government,
rule of law, and economic reform based on "market principles"); Exec. Order No.
12,850, 58 Fed. Reg. 31,327 ( 1993) ( conditioning continuation of China's most-favored
nation trade benefits on "significant progress" on, not immediate full compliance with,
several specific human rights matters). For the principal statements of international
legal standards for human rights, see generally Uni•1ersal Declaration of Human Rights,
G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., pt. 1, at 71, U.N. Doc. 1/810 (1948); Interna
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, U.N. GAOR, 2 1st Sess. ,
Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) ; International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2 200A, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49,
U.N. Doc. A/6316 ( 1966).
13. See DA.."!IEL P. MoYNIHAN, PANDEMONIUM: ETHN!CITY IN INTERNATIONAL PoLITICS
24-25, 168-70 ( 1993) ( arguing that ethnic strife, principaily as centrifugal force within
nations, is now greatest threat to internatjonal peace and security); Samuel P. Hunting
ton, The Clash of Civilizations?, FoREIGN AFF., Summer 1993, at 22, 29-35 (arguing that
"fauit lines" between civilizational groupings, generally much larger than nation-states,
"will be the battle lines of the future").
14. See, e.g., lv1alaysian Siaie Approves i\Iuslim Laws to Cut Olf'Limbs, Japan Economic
Nev15 Wire, Nov. 25, 1993, availahle in LEXIS, News Library, Non-US file ( reporting
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Second, culturalist challenges to international legal norms,
particularly in the area of human rights, have grown more ag
gressive and self-confident. Thus, there is little tone of excuse,
request for temporary indulgence, or even much interest in dia
logue to be found in Lee Kuan Yew's exegeses on the superiority
of an Eastern way in law and politics that stresses order and com
munity over rights and extreme individualism. The same can be
said of China's post-Tiananmen assertion of its own great human
rights achievements and criticism of vVestern nations' shortcom
ings, and its longer-standing dismissal of human rights as a bour
geois concept and mere pretext for Western interference in
China's internal affairs, and of several governments' united insis
tence upon a valid, distinctively Asian interpretation of human
rights in the face of the 1993 Vienna international conference
on universal human rights.15
enactment, in Malaysian province ruled by Islamic opposition party, of punishments
including stoning and whipping as part of effort to govern through Koran-based laws;
laws apply only to Muslims and would require federal government approval); Philip
Shenon, Sungai Penchalajoumal: A Malay Plot? Or Just a Well-Meaning Commune?, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 10, 1994, at A4 (reporting that ground for Islamic Al-Arqam sect leader' s
arrest was plot to replace secular government with Islamic fundamentalist regime); Bar
bara Sopkin, Mosl�m Fundamentalism Warries East Asian Governments, Agence France
Presse, Aug. 8, 1994, available in LEXJS, News Library, Non-US File (reporting that Is
lamic AJ-Arqam and Malaysia's main Islamic opposition party share goal of making Ma
laysia an Islamic state and that China is cracking down on intervention in secular affairs
by religious groups in heavily Muslim Ningxia area); Catherin Sampson, Bombers Raise
Chinese FeaTs, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, Non-US File
(reporting that Chinese authorities see bombing incident attributed to separatist Mus
lims in XirBiang area in west of country as example of growing cross-border links be
tween Muslims in China and violent fundamentalist groups in Afghanistan and Paki
stan).
15. See Philip Shenon, To fusty) Flogging, Singapare Cites 'Chaos' on U.S. Streets, N.Y.
TIMES, A pr . 13, 1994, at A2 ( quoting former Prime Minister and current Senior Minister
of Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew, as saying that U.S. society is rich, but not safe and peaceful
and not type of society Singapore chooses, and dismissing U.S. talk about human rights
as convenient sloganeering); Fareed Zakaria, Order and Libe.,-ty, East and West, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 1 1, 1994, at Al9 (quoting former Prime Minister and current Senior Minister of
Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew as saying that the "expansion of Lhe right of an individual to
behave or misbehave as he pleases has come at the expense of orderly society. In the
East, the main objective is to have a well-ordered society. ... The fundamental differ
ence ber.veen Western concepts of society and government and East Asian concepts is
that Easter:n societies believe that the individual exists in the context of his family. "); see
also GuovroYUAN XIN'At:N ZH u ZHONGGUO DE RENQUAN ZHUANGKUA.NG [STATE CouNCIL
NEws OFFICE, THE STATE OF Hu�tAN RrcHTS IN CHINA ] (1991) (known widely as the
"vVhite Paper"). The \Nhite Paper and tt'le Chinese government's subsequent public
pronouncements on human rights issues show an increased willingness to accept that
international standards are rekvant and appiicable in China. Nicholas D. Kristof, China
,
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Furthermore, the regimes urging alternative concepts of
purportedly universal legal norms increasingly meet the formal
and procedural requisites of democracy, 16 thereby weakening
many potential criticisms that invoke liberal international law
principles. At least absent the unlikely and disquieting advent of
superstates organized along cultural or civilizational lines, 17 irrel
evance or perversity of consequences seems to await any ap
proach to international law that fails to recognize such richly
substantive and strikingly transnational developments as some
thing much more than peripheral issues in a game among co
herent, unitary actors, essentially undifferentiated except in
their levels of power.
The crumbling of Soviet power and the retreat of commu
nist ideology inside and beyond the former Soviet empire are
Issues Rebuttal to Human Rights Critics, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1991, § l, pt. l, at 12; Philip
Shenon, Want to Sell China's Record on Human Rights? Get Mr. Smooth, N.Y. TIMES , Aug.
28, 1994, § 4, at 7 (reporting that president of nominally non-governmental Chinese
Society for Human Rights criticized Western nations' failures on human rights); cf
Wang Xiujing, Shehuizhuyi renquan yu zebenzhuyi renquan de genben qubie [Basic Distinctions
Between Socialist Human Rights and Capitalist Human Rights] and Li Linmei, Zhuquan
yuanze he renquan de guoji baohu [The Principle of Sovereignty and International Protection of
Human Rights] in ZH ONNG UO SHEHUI KExuE YuAN FAXUE YANJIUsuo, DANGDAJ RENQUAN
[CHINESE ACADEMY oF SociAL Sci E NC ES LEGAL REsEARcH INsTITUTE, CoNTEMPORARY
HuMAN RIGHTS] 205-20, 362-74 ( 1992) (post-White Paper publications reflecting the
longer-standing Peoples Republic of China approaches stressing that human rights
have different characteristics in different class society contexts, and the status of na
tional sovereignty over domestic matters as a legal principle in no way inferior to
human rights claims); see also Susumu Awanohara et a!., Vienna Showdown, FAR E. EcoN.
REv., June 17, 1993, at 16 (describing Asian critique of Western attempt to impose
"Western traditions" in guise of human rights); Michael Vatikiotis, Cultural Divide, FAR
E. EcoN. REv., June 17, 1993, at 20 (describing emerging East Asian theory of "situa
tional uniqueness" to justifY "distinctive positions on human-rights issues"); Gordon
Fairclough, Standing Firm, FAR E. EcoN. REv., Apr. 15, 1993, at 22 (reporting Asian
nations' agreement in preparation for Vienna Conference on Bangkok Declaration,
which stresses non-interference in internal affairs and "socio-economic, historical and
cultural backgrounds" as legitimate sources of human rights variations).
16. See SNv!UEL P. HuNTINGTON, THE THIRD \NAvE: DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE LATE
T-WENTIETH CENTURY 5-9, 2 1-26, 28-30 ( 1991) (discussing trend towards democracy
since mid-1970's).
17. On the continuing strength and importance of states in an era of "civiliza
tional" cleavages and loyalties, see Fouad 1\jami, The Summoning, FoREIGN AFF., Sept.
Oct. 1993, at 2, 9 ("[C]ivilizations do not control states, states control civilizations.").
The difficulties and dangers of any attempted transition to civilization-states lie, not
least, in what would be required to overcome the persisting strength of nation-states, in
the near-impossibility (absent massive dislocation of people) of drawing boundaries in
mixed areas, and in the potential multiplication of ethnic and nationalist pressures for
disintegration that already plague more modestly sized nation-states.
,
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central elements in another challenge to the existing order in
international law and politics. Shaken, indeed shattered, are a
bipolar structure and a polarizing ideology that together made
the nation-state the central institutional focus and marginalized
concern with differences in legal and political regimes among
and within nations, except for those differences immediately rel
evant to the Manichean struggle between communism and lib
eral democracy.
It has become less plausible to conceive of international law
and politics in either of two familiar ways:

(1)

as a global order,

anchored by two superpowers, in which two types of states,
although very different internally, can interact under shared and
neutral, albeit sparse, rules, even as they take sides in other
countries' civil conflicts (conceived of as conflicts over which
"side" such ultimately unitary states will join); or

(2)

as a partial

order among the nations of the West and some of their ex-colo
nies in which the United States, as hegemon, provides and en
forces more elaborate, more law-like rules of international inter
action within a more limited community.18 Exposed and per
haps encouraged by the decline of such analytical frameworks
and the patterns of behavior they explained and endorsed is a
world in which states are more seriously fragmented internally,
with many groups embracing radically divergent ideas about do
mestic and international law, and sharing common goals with
like-minded groups in other countries.
Such challenges to the received order might appear to be
mere extensions of developments recognized for the last twenty
years or more. Certainly, "interdependence theory" in interna
tional relations scholarship, academic legal arguments for focus
ing on "transnational law" (and not the narrower, more state
centric field of "international law"), and the practices such argu
ments reflected and influenced all sought to deal with a world in
which legal and political rules could not assume that nation
states were internally cohesive and externally impermeable.19
18. Such views of international relations run through political scientists' writings
on international relations, although their theories make surprisingly little reference to
international law. See MoRGANTHAU, supra note 3, at 282, 363-64 (discussing first view);
WALTZ, supra note 3, at 193 (discussing first view); see also KEoHANE, supra note 3, at 3 139 (discussing second view).
19. RoBERT 0. KEoHANE & JosEPH S. NYE, PoWER ru'-ID INTERDEPENDENCE: WoRLD
POLITICS IN TRANSITION 3-8, 23-28, 33-36 ( 1977); HENRY J. STEINER & DETLEV F. VAGTS,
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those

responses

seemed to require, at most, only moderate reform of the estab
lished order.
Before the widespread retreat from Marxist-Leninist ortho
doxy and before the Soviet implosion, the most visible forces un
dermining a state-centered international legal order were mar
ket-oriented

economic

exchanges,

organizational

networks

among cosmopolitanly-educated elites in business, g overnment,
or citizens' groups, and ties that linked groups in industrial de
mocracies and narrow segments of
world. 20

the rapidly

developing

Generally, the political focus of such transnationally

linked groups was on relatively narrow issues and on influencing
national laws and policies through established, legitimate chan
nels. There was little in this that immediately and fundamentally
challenged the political integrity of the relevant sovereign states
or that seemed any more seriously in tension with a liberal inter
national order than domestic liberalism always had been.21
Although it is hard to demonstrate with certainty, we now
seem to face a more volatile combination of deeper and more
varied intranational schisms between groups and potentially
stronger international links among them.

Cold War organiza

tional and ideological structures are no longer available to sup
press, channel, or at least mask, primordial
TRAl"'SNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS (3d ed. 1986); PHILIP C.

or

nascent cleavages

JESSUP,

TRANSNATIONAL LAw

2-3 (1956).
20. Interdependence with the industrial democracies and the rest of the Western
linked world

was

limited for pre-reform communist states by such states' monistic and

totalistic domestic political structures and ideologies that limited the growth of the kind
of autonomous groups that established transnational netv/orks elsewhere, and by their
autarchic approach to international economic relations rooted in a "siege mentality"
reinforced by Western hostility (sometimes reflected in statutes governing international
economic relations).

See

ToNY SMITH, THrNJ-t..ING L:KE

A

CoMMUNIST: STATE AND LEGITI

/-.1ACY IN THE SoviET UNION, CHINA, Ai"'D CuBA 182-85, 191-92 (1987) (discussing essen
tial characteristics of communist thought);

see also A.

DoAK BARNETT, CHINA IN THE

WoRLD EcoNOM"'i 122-32 (1981) (describing struggle between Cultural Revolution radi

cals a:1d proponents of reform about political significance of opening China to foreign
investment and trade). For U.S. stawtes denying trade and aid to communist countries,

see, e.g., 19 U.S.C.S. § 2432 (1994) (tying countries' most-favored-nation ("1-vfFN") status
to emigration freedoms they grant to citizens); 22 U.S.C.S. § 2370 (1994) (prohibiting

assistance to present Cuban government).
21. For illustrations of the tensions bctvveen some liberal principles

ity) when

applied to si2tes and

tional boundaries, see Tucker,
THEORY

AND

when
supra

(chiefly equal

applied to individuals ·.vithout regard

w

interna

note 10, at 61-62; CHARLES R BEITZ, PoLITICAL

INTERNATIONAL Rf.L\.T!ONS 65-66, 18.'2

(1979).
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in seemingly countless states, old and n ew. In Eastern Europe
an d the former Soviet Union, in reform-era China, and in the
rapidly developing nations of East Asia, the network of transna
tional economic ties has expanded rapidly to encompass, an d to
penetrate m ore deeply, areas that are m ore thoroughly n on
Western in their legal and p olitical cultures and less fully m arket
oriented in their laws, policies, and practices.

Moreover, with

n ew legal tolerance and new technology, a diverse transnational
flow of ideas h as rapidly come to supplement, and some ti m es
threaten, ties based on business or on narrow issues.
Thus, Chinese leaders determined to rein in perceived ex
cesses of reform face not merely the risk that hard-won , m o dest
advances toward rul e by law may with er, but also the prospect of
stinging trade sanctions under U . S . law and costly U . S.-backed
delays in j oining world trade bodies. 22 Domestically, they fac e an
unprecedentedly vVesternized and outward-looking group of dis
sidents and critics who are sophisticated about, and insist upon,
dom estic law reform and adherence

to in ternational

legal

n orms.23
Similarly, a Malaysian political leadership that down grades
M alay-Muslim nationalism and economic planning to reaffirm a
secular legal order, the benefits of English education in acces
sing Western knowledge, and th e virtues of pro-market laws and
note 1 2 ; Lionel Barber & Nancy Dunne,
FrN. TIMES, Nov. 2 1 , 1991, § I, at 9 (describ
ing mixture of h uman rights and trade issues in negotiations between presiden t and
Congress over conditions to be impos ed on renewal of China's MFN status) ; cf. Thomas
L. Friedman, China Syndrome, N.Y. TiMES, Jan. 8, 1 995, § 4, at 19 (reportin g that U.S.
business executives who support Uni ted S tates ' im p osi n g trade sanctions against China
for intellectual property violations and blocking China's entry into World Trade Organ
ization, see link between Chinese government's h uman rights abuses and trade abuses,
with both reflecting absence of rule of law ) .
23. See, e.g. , Wei jingsheng, The Fifth Modernization, i n THE FrrrH MoDERNIZATION:
CHINA's HurvtAN RlcHTS MovEi\IENT, 1 978-1 979 (James D. Seymour ed., 1980) (present
ing argument, by one of l eading participants in Democracy Wall movemen t of 1 978-79,
that post-Mao regime should and must recognize h uman rights ) ; TvVilliam P. Alford,

22.

See

Exec. Order No. 1 2,850,

su,vra

Fears Grow that Bush Will Back Dovm on China,

Douhle-Edged Swords Cut Both Ways: Law and Legitimacy in the People 's Republic of China, in
CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 45, 45-46, 57-59 (Tu Wei-ming ed. , 1 994) (detailing attempts
to seek judicial redress against Party and state organs and officials, principally for ac
tions taken against p lain tiffs in connection with plaimiffs' roles in 1 989 protests) ; Pat
rick E. Tyler, In Beijing, Dissideats Fi/;; New Petitions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1 995, at A8
(reporting that, in order to ensure protection of fundamental h uman rights, Chinese
dissidents petitioned National People's Congress to strengthen rule of law, and to un
dertake investigations of cases where citizens ' legitimate rights have been violated by
authori ties) .
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policies confronts newly radical challenges from m ovem ents that
seek to enact Islamic law as state legislation or that threaten to
become a diffuse state within the nation, beyond the reach of
sovereign power. The regime, correctly or not, sees conspiracies
that cross national boundaries and a rising international tide of
Islamic fundam entalism behind its troubles, and feels c o mpelled
to prove its own Islamic

bona fides

even as it cracks down on reli

gious radicals.24 In such a world, a perspective that sees a pri m e
virtue in legal rules that are simple, uniform, a n d international
(in the sense of being rules for and among nation-states) does
not portend a central and leading role for law in inte rnational
affairs.
The great danger for those who favor a strong role for n a
tional law in the coming years is a failure to adapt to the chal
lenges of internal fragmentation and transnational ties. Several
signs of the perils of a failure of imagination are visible . First, an
attempt to reanimate some of the hoariest principles of the past
seems doomed to frustration. Relying on principles of collective
security and the sanctity of sovereign states, and organized in
large part through the United Nations, the Gulf War alliance in
creasingly seems confined to its facts and the stuff of nostalgia 
incapable of repetition, yet subj ect to pervasive review.25 Beset
with doubts about the appropriate grounds and practical conse24. William Case, Malaysia in 1 993: Accelerating Trends and Mild Resistance, 3 4 AsiAN
SuRv. 1 1 9, 1 20-24 ( 1 994) ( describing government's policies); Malaysian State Approves
Muslim Laws to Cut Off Limbs, supra note 1 4; see generally Wu MIN AuN, THE MALAYSIAN
LEGAL SYSTEM 38-40 ( 1 990) (describing jurisdiction of Islamic courts in Malaysia); Ah
med Rashid, March of tlre Militants, FAR E . EcoN. REv. , Mar. 9, 1 995, at 19 (reporting
Malaysian Prime Minister Datuk Seri Mahathir's banning of fundamentalist Islamic Al
Arqam sect, in part for training death squad in Thailand); Shenon, supra note 1 4 , at A4
(noting that Islamic Al-Arqam sect claims numerous sympathizers abroad); Michael
Richardson, Malaysia and Neighbors to Curb Sects, I NT ' L HERALD TRIB., Aug. 5, 1 994, avail
able in, LEXIS, News Library, Non-US File (reporting that Islamic Al-Arqam sect oper
ates some 50 villages in Malaysia with schools, shops, health clinics, and other facilities
for members; that sect is banned, or faces banning, in Indonesia and Brunei; that its
leader is banned from three neighboring countries; and that 19 Malaysian members of
sect were arrested at Cairo fundamentalist demonstration in April, 1 994) ; Sopkin, supra
note 1 4 (reporting that Al-Arqam sect leader lived in exile in Jordan after 1988) .
25. For analyses of the Gulf War's implications for international law and U.S. for
eign relations iaw, and a recognition that replicabil ity of the Gulf War approach is se
verely limited, see Paul W. Kahn, Lessons for International Law from the Gulf War, 45 STAN .
L. REv. 425 ( 1 993) ; Oscar Schachter, United Nations Law in the Gulf Conflict, 85 AM. J.
INT'L L. 452 ( 1 99 1 ) ; Burns H. Weston, The Gulf Crisis in Intemational and Foreign Rela
tions Law, Continued, 85 A!.t. ]. ll'n'L L. 5 1 6 ( 1 99 1 ) ; Michael ]. Glennon, The Gulf War
and the Constitution, FORE IGN AFF., Spring 199 1 , at 84.
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quences of intervention, the tortured and hesitant multilateral
efforts to address the Bosnian crisis may better indicate the fate
awaiting such conventional approaches under the conditions
likely to prevail in the coming years.
Second, the international legal enterprise shows signs of
shrinking toward public regulation of international trade and in
vestment. That possibility is illustrated by the Clinton Adminis
tration' s East Asian diplomacy that has emphasized international
legal standards for fair trade, U . S. laws that impose trade sanc
tions or deny most-favored-nation status, and cabinet-level road
shows to promote U .S. business abroad.26

Here, the interna

tional legal norms of free trade amid limited economic national
ism are relatively steady beacons, and the recognition of subna
tional actors with transnational links (and domestic legislative
and regulatory agendas) can be relatively frank and open.27
Such an approach, however, threatens to exclude from the cen
tral focus of international law much that is of interest and impor
tance in wo rld affairs .
Third, imprecise notions of broad principles of interna
tional law or isolated fragments of international law doctrines
both may be invoked haphazardly and unsystematically to sup
port particular actions. The United States' humanitarian inter
vention in Somalia, its delayed intervention by invitation in Ha
iti, and its decoupling of human rights and trade in China, sug
gest the ambiguities and limitations of such approaches to the
uses and meaning of international law. Without some integrat26. See, e.g. , Susumu Awanohara & Nayan Chanda, Uncommon Bonds, FAR E . EcoN.
REv. , Nov. 1 8, 1 993, at 1 6- 1 7 (reporting that U .S. goals at Asia-Paci fic Economic Coop
eration ("APEC") forum are to accelerate global trade l iberalization, and to strengthen
trade with Asia) ; David E. Sanger, President Imposes Sanctions on Chinese Goods, N .Y. TIMES,
Feb. 5, 1 995, § I, at 1 ( announcing sanctions to be imposed under "super 3 0 1 " provision
of trade statutes, 19 U.S.C.S. § 2420) ; Exec. Order No. 1 2 ,850, supra note 1 2 ; Patrick E .
Tyler, Ron Brown i n China: Trade Gets a n open Door, Human Rights the Closet, N .Y. TIMES,
Sept. 4, 1 994, § 4, at 2 ( reporting on mission to China by U.S. Commerce Secretary Ron
Brown and U.S. executives to promote sign ing of agreements between U.S. firms and
Chinese) .
27. See, e.g. , Friedman, supra note 22, at 19 ( reporting pressure and support from
U . S. business interests in decisions to de-link MFN and human rights, and to impose
sanctions for Chinese violations of intellectual property righ ts) ; Sanger, supra note 26,
at 1 ( reporting U.S. Administration 's explanation of how sanctions were crafted so as to
minimize harm to U.S. industries and consumers) ; Awanohara & Chanda, supra note
26, at 1 6- 1 7 (q uoting U.S. State Department official on importance of domestic job
growth in U.S. approach to APEC summit) .
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ing strategy or guiding norms, it proves exceedingly difficult to
articulate determinative criteria, especially ones sounding in in
ternational law, for deciding what action to take, what counts as
successful action, and why to act

m

one case and not in an

other.28
Nevertheless,

the

cns1s

confronting

international

law

presents opportunities as well as dangers. For those in the West
who seek a vibrant role for international law, there is something
potentially liberating in the new cultural challenge' s shaking the
early post-colonial belief in an elaborate and largely inseverable,
if internally contradictory, package of a liberal legal order
among nation-states and liberal legal orders within states. The
same can be said of the impact of the Soviet collapse and the
more widespread softening of communism on the sense of mor
tal duty to promote and protect that package unquestioningly.
vVith former senses of confidence and urgency gone, propo
nents of a liberal order and a leading role for law in global af
fairs may, indeed must, turn to a more critical examination of
their goals and a more strategic approach to the roles of interna
tional law.
The critical examination entails an inquiry into what on the
laundry list of specific human rights, democratic values, sover
eignty, self-determination, and the like make the most compel
ling demands now that it seems impossible, and unnecessary, to
pursue simultaneous progress on all fronts. Given the decline in
28.

For the variety of international legal principles available, and the fl exibility of

their connections to a course of action, delayed action or inactio n , see Letter to the
President,

13

OP. Orr. LEGAL

CouNs. 6, 7 ( 1 992 ) (suggesting th at "pri n ciples of custom

ary international law" jus tify planned Ame rican military i n tervention in ligh t of "urgent
need for h umanitarian assistan ce" and "breakdown of governm e n tal authority, " but de
clining to decide the issue in light of other sources of authority, including Security
Council resolution authorizing all necessary means for promoting human i tarian relief,
statutory authorization for h umanitarian aid, and President's gen eral authority over use
of troops) ; Letter to Congressional Leaders on Haiti,
(Sept.

18 , 1 994)

30 WEEKLY COM P

.

PREs.

Doc.

180 1

(citing, in support of troop deployment after in ternational accord

reached, U.N. resolution authorizing "all necessary means" to restore democratic gov
ernment, particular national security i n terests of Un i ted States in responding to gross
abuses of human rights and in promoting restoration of democratic govern ment) ; Th e
President's News Conference,

30 WEEKLY CoMP.

PREs.

Doc. 1 1 66

( May 2 6 ,

1 994) ( be

cause "best opportunity to lay the basis for long-term sustainable progress in human
rights" in China is through continuation of most-favored nation s tatus and promotion
of in creased contacts, President will extend China's MF1--J trade status despite China's

fail ure to satisfy standard, mandated as condi tion of renewal in previous year's China
MFN executive order, of "overall significant progress" in specific areas ) .
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the persuasive power of Cold War, cultural relativist, and anti
colonial j ustifications for an order based upon unitary nation
states, the most appealing and promising move may be to shift
emphasis toward the previously subordinate project:

interna

tional law's contribution to the promotion of liberal values
within nations.

Thus, minimal dignitary interests - freedom

from torture, arbitrary imprisonment, or severe m aterial depriva
tion - may merit pride of place, possibly on the ground that
little else of value can be secured in their absence. 29 Alterna
tively, political process values, such as democratization, might
warrant preeminence, perhaps on a theory that such principles
best combine the promise of participation, which may be valued
for its own sake, and of a mechanism well-suited to the achieve
ment of preferred substantive outcomes.30
If a persuasive lexical ordering of specific values proves elu
sive or incomplete, a strategic approach becomes all the more
essential. A strategic approach requires asking whether it will be
successful or efficient to undertake expenditures of concededly
limited material and moral resources to advance the realization
of particular principles. Promotion of minimal dignitary inter
ests, for example, may score high in expected efficacy, for these
interests may well be matters of broad transnational consensus
29.

That intuition would also appear to be reflected in the tendency of i n te ma··

tiona! human rights organizations to focus much of their en ergy on questions of arbi
trary o r pol itically motivated detention, severe custodial punishments and the l i ke. See,

1 995 ( 1994 ) ; AsiA WATCH, ANTHEMS OF DE.
1 989-92 ( 1 992 ) ; AMNESTY INTERNATiONAL, ToR

e.g. , HuM>\N RiGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT
FEAT: CRACKDOWN IN HuNAN PROvlNCE,
TURE

IN THE EIGHTIES

4-5 ( 1984) ;

THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

30.

A\1NES1Y lNTERNATIONA.L, POLITICAL lM!'RISONMENT IN

( 1 978 ) .

Compared to the vision evident i n some earlier American forays i n to promo

tion of dem ocracy abroad, i t is likely that such a notion of democratization wi l l have to
be relatively sparse in i ts requirements, an d thus relatively broad i n its definition of
what is to

be expected or accepted. See SAMUEL P. HuNTINGTON & JoAN M. NELSON, N o
42 ( 1 976) ( noting that developing countries face trade-offs among increas

EASY CHOiCE

ing political parti c i pation, increasing econ omic growth, and fos tering social and eco
nomic equality) .

Compare HuNTINGTON,

supm

note

1 6,

at

1 64-209, 2 53-58

( describing

considerable variety of methods by which, and contexts in which, recent trans i tions to
democracy have occ urred, and have differed from earlier "waves" of democratization)

and GuiLLERMO O ' DoNNELL & PHILIPPE C. ScHMITTER, TRANSITIONS FROM AuTHORITA

TENTATNE CONCLUSIONS ABOUT UNCERTAIN DEMOCRACIES ( 1 986) ( noting
with RoBERT PACKENHAM, LIBERAL AMERICA AND THE THIRD WoRLD 1 23-30 ( 1 973)
(discussing U.S. conviction in the 1 950's and 1 9 60's that U.S. aid could result in eco

RL;_N RULE:
same)

nomic growth, broad!)' rising stan dards of living, s tability, and democratic politics ali
emerging smoothly, mutually reinforcingly, and along essentially U.S.
in develo p ing countries ) .

or

Western lines
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(and o f even broader lip-service). Alternatively, democratic val
ues may seem strong candidates because their lack of obvious
and immediate substantive content promises flexibility sufficient
to accommodate diverse political and legal cultures.
Such ruminations over pragmatism and principle are ini
tially likely to occur primarily in major industrial democracies'
domestic debates about foreign affairs laws and policies.

Some

elements of the approach they might yield are already in place,
although those elements are at best fragmentary and subject to
much revision. The U.S. Code, for example, includes numerous
provisions imposing sanctions or denying aid on the basis of
other states' noncompliance with a variety of specific interna
tional human rights or liberal economic standards.31

Those

standards might reflect some of the norms that U.S. citizens
most prize or that the United States can most fruitfully promote
abroad, or they could be replaced by standards that do incorpo
rate such norms. Common statutory provisions that trigger legal
consequences only upon findings of "consistent patterns" of
"gross violations" of human rights in target countries, and the
partially discretionary character of many statutory sanctions sug
gest a recognition of the importance of prudential concerns.32
They also suggest room for an approach that addresses them

3 1 . See, e.g. , 22 U.S.C.S.

§

2304 (d) ( 1 ) ( 1 994) (representing typ ical provision defin

ing "gross violation of internationally recognized hu man rights" - a basis for denying
security assistance

�

as including "torture or cruel, in human, o r degrading treatment

or punish m ent, prolonged detention without charges and trial, causing the disappear
ance of persons" ) ; 19 U.S.C.S.

§

2432 ( 1 994) (prohibiting MFN s tatus for "n on-market

economy country" that denies or financially burdens emigrati on ) ; 2 2 U . S . C . S .

§

2 295 ( a )

( 1 994) ( condi tioning aid t o former Soviet Union counrries on respect fo r i n ternation
ally recognized human rights including rights of minorities and freedom of rel i gion
and emigration, and on progress toward democratic system, representative govern
ment, rule of law and economy based on market principles, an d private ownershi p ) ; 1 2
U . S.C.S.

§

635 ( b ) ( 2 ) ( 1 994) (prohibiting Export-Import Bank credits to cou ntries with

Marxist-Leninist planned econ omies ) .
3 2 . See, e.g. , 22 U . S.C.S.

§

2 1 5 l (a) ( 1 994) ( " consistent pattern of gross vi olations"

provi sion in development assistance statute ) ; 1 9 U .S.C.S.

§

2432 (c) ( 2 ) ( 1 994) ( p rovid

ing that President has authority to waive MFN prohibition upon determination that
waiver wi l l promote statute's goals ) ; 2 2 U.S.C.S.

§

2304(a) ( 2 ) ( 1 994) ( providing that

President h as auth o ri ty to waive security assistance ban upon determination that certain
"extraordin ary circumstances" exist) ; 2 2 U.S.C.S.

§

2295a ( c ) ( providing that President

has authority to extend aid to i n eligible countries of former Soviet Union upon de ter
mination that providing assistance would be in national interest or would promote stat
ute's substan tive goals ) .
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un d er a more coherent and systematic policy, and less in an ad
hoc manner.
These prudential concerns also point to the other side of
th e opportunities presented by the intranational fragm entation
an d transnational linkages that seem to characterize the era n ow
upo n us. Within the nations of the East and the South , signifi
cant groups have come to adapt and adopt as their own views
quite compatible with many i tems on an imaginable agenda for
p rom oting liberal dom estic legal orders and a robust role for
in ternational law.33 Underscoring the dynamism and indetermi

nacy of approaches to law and p olitics outside the West, th e pres

ence of such groups undermines simplistic cul tural relativist cri
tiques, and offers fertile soil for transnational linkages to foster
domestic legal and p olitical changes on a front much broader
than that promised by international economic interdependen c e .
By establishing ties with like-minded coun terparts in t h e West
and by making appeals to international legal principles, such
groups may find material, diplomatic, and intellectual resources
with which to strengthen their hands at home. Thus, for impor
tant segments of profoundly diverse societies, prudence and
principle can coincide both in defining the roles of interna
tional law and in shaping domestic law in non-Western nations.
What emerges is a prospective role for international law in
which i t becomes more closely linked to domestic legal orders
and global liberal agendas in a species of transnational law for
the twenty-first century. With the notion of international law's
proj ect so conceived, advocates of strong roles and liberal

con

tent for such law can keep faith with their own core principles
(albeit a more eclectic and pragmatic subset of those pri n ciples ) .
At the same time, these advocates can keep faith with the fu ture
sought by their counterparts outside the West who are engaged
in struggles to promote similar values in their nations' dom estic
legal orders and their states' engagemen t with the in ternational
legal order.

33.

See, e.g. , Sidney Jones, The Organic Growth: Asian NGOs Have Come into Their

REv., June 1 7, 1 993, at 23 ( n oting importance of Asian n on-govern
mental organizations' efforts in forcing Asian governments to heed demands of poor,
marginalized, and abused) .
Own,

F.-\R E. EcoN.

